



VMUN 2024

Intelligence Crisis Committee

BACKGROUND GUIDE

Syrian Arab Republic



VANCOUVER MODEL UNITED NATIONS

The Twenty-Third Annual Session | January 26–28, 2024

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Dear Delegates,

My name is Eddy Qin, and I am extremely thrilled and honoured to serve as the Director of the Intelligence Crisis Committee for Vancouver Model United Nations 2024. I have been in Model UN for almost five years and am in my Grade 12 year at St. George's School. For this year's iteration of VMUN, I have the absolute privilege to be staffing alongside Celina Qu, your chair, and Finley Rolfe, your crisis staff.

When I first joined Model United Nations at the young age of 12, I immediately felt included in a community of passionate and like-minded individuals. Stepping into my first committee at this very conference in 2019, I was perpetually enthused and exceedingly excited during my first speech as the nation of Guyana. Despite my questionable antics in my first conference, I learned much about diplomacy, an art whose thrill is akin to a non-spectator sport. My adventure in Model United Nations has been nothing less than a fantastic, educational, and rewarding experience, and I solemnly hope that your experience can be the same.

With the intense and dichotomic nature of the Intelligence Crisis Committee (INTEL), I recommend all delegates push past their comfort zone and not be afraid to attempt extreme measures in keeping their national security in check. For the twenty-third iteration of the Vancouver Model United Nations, INTEL will be negotiating, debating, and discussing the 1979 Soviet-Afghan War. Additionally, I encourage you all to read over the background guide and conduct the necessary research for the preparation of the upcoming conference.

I can confidently say that, at every moment of my service in MUN, my heart has been filled with an indescribable sense of pride and humility upon seeing heartfelt delegates taking upon their shoulders this noble and self-sacrificing task. On behalf of your entire dais team, we truly hope that VMUN 2024 will aid you in the creation of lifelong connections, memories, and fun learning experiences. If you have any questions, please contact us at intel@vmun.com.

Sincerely,

Eddy Qin
INTEL Director

Position Paper Policy

What is a Position Paper?

A position paper is a brief overview of a country's stance on the topics being discussed by a particular committee. Though there is no specific format the position paper must follow, it should include a description of your positions your country holds on the issues on the agenda, relevant actions that your country has taken, and potential solutions that your country would support.

At Vancouver Model United Nations, delegates should write a position paper for each of the committee's topics. Each position paper should not exceed one page and should all be combined into a single document per delegate.

For the Intelligence Crisis Committee, position papers are mandatory.

Formatting

Position papers should:

- Include the name of the delegate, their country, and the committee
- Be in a standard font (e.g. Times New Roman) with a 12-point font size and 1-inch document margins
- Not include illustrations, diagrams, decorations, national symbols, watermarks, or page borders
- Include citations and a bibliography, in any format, giving due credit to the sources used in research (not included in the 1-page limit)

Due Dates and Submission Procedure

Position papers for this committee must be submitted by **11:59 PM PT on January 22, 2024**. Once your position paper is complete, please save the file as your last name, your first name and send it as an attachment in an email to your committee's email address, with the subject heading as "[last name] [first name] — Position Paper". Please do not add any other attachments to the email.

Both your position papers should be combined into a single PDF or Word document file; position papers submitted in another format will not be accepted.

Each position paper will be manually reviewed and considered for the Best Researched award.

The email address for this committee is *intel@vmun.com*.

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Soviet-Afghan War, 1979

Overview

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the world underwent many significant technological and socioeconomic advancements.¹ Alongside globalization, this substantial progress in innovation spread political ideologies faster than the world had ever seen. As thousand-year traditions monarchies across the globe collapsed, the world was in search of alternative ways to govern. The ideological battles of this era are defined by the communist Soviet Union and the capitalist United States, which after World War II, entered into a conflict aimed to unite the world under their respective ideologies, known today as the Cold War.² Soviet socialism stemmed from the early 20th century when many Russians were frustrated by extreme disparities in wealth, living conditions, and social treatment. Therefore, the Soviets adopted a form of Marxist-Leninist socialism in which all socioeconomic classes held state power, known as the dictatorship of the proletariat. The United States, in contrast, was built off of a capitalist system, where profit was typically the priority for large multinational corporations and the government. However, this system largely neglected the needs of certain groups of people in American society, leading to significant rates of wealth inequality and poorly functioning social services. By the mid-20th century, the clashing ideologies of the Soviet Union and the United States threatened the world with armed conflict.

The Soviet-Afghanistan War begins in 1979 and is mainly attributed to the rising instability in the Middle Eastern region. With the recent Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, Afghanistan is the only country in the Middle Eastern continent that still carries a communist system.³ Furthermore, with pro-Western capitalist ideologies and resistance spreading across the Eastern Bloc, the Soviet Union believes that it is crucial to maintain the communist dictatorship of Afghanistan as a demonstration of communist power to Eastern European resistance movements. Additionally, they also need to keep their borders secure in order to focus more of their resources on quelling anti-communist movements domestically and within the Eastern Bloc.

In the Intelligence Crisis Committee (INTEL), delegates will dive into the tumultuous times of the Cold War from the perspectives of national governments and their associated intelligence agencies within the context of the Soviet-Afghanistan conflict. These agencies play a part in covert military operations that overthrow governments, collect information about the enemy, and operate counterintelligence to stifle the activities of foreign intelligence agencies.⁴ Governments must work to counteract the diplomatic and public fallback from often controversial military and espionage activities. This unique crisis will see governments and intelligence services work together—or against each other—to achieve their aims within an intelligence war spanning the Soviet-Afghan timeline.

¹ Walker, J. Samuel. "The Origins of the Cold War in United States History Textbooks." *The Journal of American History* 81, no. 4 (1995): 1652–61. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2081654>.

² Ibid.

³ Hoodbhoy, Pervez. "Afghanistan and the Genesis of Global Jihad." *Peace Research* 37, no. 1 (2005): 15–30. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24469676>.

⁴ Kevin Stack, "The Cold War Intelligence Score," *American Intelligence Journal* 18, no. 1/2 (1998): 69-72.

Timeline

1921 — The Soviet Union officially establishes diplomatic relations with Afghanistan.⁵

1924 — The USSR signs a trade agreement with Afghanistan, facilitating economic cooperation between the two nations. These new economic ties also brought Soviet influence towards the Middle East.⁶

August 15, 1926 — After a short war with Afghanistan, a peace treaty is signed where the Bolsheviks recognized Afghanistan's independence and withdrew from the country.⁷

August 21, 1934 — The United States formally recognizes Afghanistan from a letter to King Zahir.⁸

September 1, 1939 — World War II begins with Germany invading Poland. Subsequently, the United Kingdom, United States, and Soviet Union formed a bloc known as the Allies, while Germany, Italy, and Japan formed the Axis powers.⁹

August 1, 1945 — The Potsdam Agreement is signed by the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom. As a result, Germany is divided into four occupation zones moving into the post-war period.¹⁰

1946–1949 — Soviet satellite states are established across Eastern Europe, most notably in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.¹¹

March 12, 1947 — U.S. President Harry Truman establishes the Truman Doctrine, an informal doctrine aimed at supporting anti-communist regimes to prevent countries from falling to communism. The doctrine defined U.S. foreign policy for much of the Cold War.¹²

1955 — The Soviet Union provides Afghanistan with its first military aid package, supplying small arms and training.¹³

1956 — The USSR and Afghanistan sign a cultural exchange agreement, promoting educational and cultural ties between the two countries. Nikita Krushchev, the premier of the USSR, agrees to help Afghanistan in its struggles, further strengthening their ties.

1960s — The Soviet Union assists Afghanistan in developing its infrastructure, including constructing roads, dams, and industrial projects.¹⁴

March 8, 1965 — The United States begins an armed intervention supporting the Southern Vietnam Government. Their motive is to prevent the Vietnamese nation from falling into the communist sphere of influence and, subsequently, the neighbouring countries of Vietnam.¹⁵

⁵ "A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan," PBS NewsHour, May 4, 2011, August 30, 2021, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/asia-jan-june11-timeline-afghanistan>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, "Timeline of the Cold War," Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, n.d., https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/public/TrumanCIA_Timeline.pdf.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ "A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan," PBS NewsHour, May 4, 2011, August 30, 2021, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/asia-jan-june11-timeline-afghanistan>.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, "Timeline of the Cold War," Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, n.d.,

July 17, 1973 — A military coup led by Mohammed Daoud Khan overthrows the Afghan monarchy, establishing a republic.¹⁶

April 27, 1978 — The Saur Revolution takes place in Afghanistan, leading to the overthrow of Daoud Khan's government.¹⁷

April 28, 1978 — The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seizes power, establishing a socialist government. Subsequently, the PDPA begins to 'de-islamify' the nation by implementing strict laws against practicing religion.¹⁸

December 5, 1978 — Anti-government protests erupt in Herat, Afghanistan, leading to a violent crackdown by the PDPA regime.¹⁹

December 20, 1978 — The Soviet Union sends military advisors and aid to Afghanistan to support the PDPA government.²⁰

April 17, 1979 — The Soviet Union signs a friendship treaty with Afghanistan, solidifying their alliance and providing military assistance.²¹

December 24, 1979 (Crisis Initiation) — The Soviet Union, alongside PDPA troops, begins an invasion of Afghanistan to quell anti-government protests.²²

Historical Analysis

The start of tensions in the Cold War period are primarily attributed to a desire to expand the influence of the two blocs and their respective political ideologies—the Western bloc and its liberal democratic leaders, opposed by the Eastern bloc and its communist allies.²³ Western states, particularly the United States, saw the promotion of capitalist ideals as beneficial to the economic prosperity of the West. It would supply and strengthen the economies of Western nations, which relied on cheap goods and raw materials exported from developing nations. Although many Western politicians asserted that the bloc promoted democracy and freedom, many countries allied with the West had dictatorial governments.²⁴ The confrontation between the Western and Eastern bloc was inevitable as Soviet support of global communist movements would hurt the economic expansion of Western nations.²⁵

https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/public/TrumanCIA_Timeline.pdf

¹⁶ "A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan," PBS NewsHour, May 4, 2011, August 30, 2021, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/asia-jan-june11-timeline-afghanistan>.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, "Timeline of the Cold War," Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, n.d., https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/public/TrumanCIA_Timeline.pdf.

²³ Merrill, Dennis. "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006): 27–37. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552744>.

²⁴ "Military Dictatorship," Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/military-dictatorship>.

²⁵ Merrill, Dennis. "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006): 27–37. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552744>.

Mutual Assured Destruction Doctrine

Many developments in nuclear war tactics were made during the early and mid-Cold War period (1949–1963).²⁶ From inventing the intermediate intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to revolutionary changes in warfare doctrine, the global stage—in the event of a large-scale conflict—would foresee a nuclear catastrophe. When the U.S. invented the atomic bomb, Joseph Stalin believed that it would be used to pressure the Soviet Union. Stalin would purposely act unfazed by the atomic bomb during post-war meetings with Truman to prove his “tenacity and steadfastness” approach in talking with the United States.²⁷ Soviet developments in their own atomic bomb project also began to come to fruition during this time. With the Soviet Union’s first successful test in 1949 and subsequent production of these weapons, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union understood that a war on a global scale would only result in nuclear fallout.

However, this theory would not be tested until the Korean War (1950–1953) when the Soviet government quickly subdued speculations of Soviet involvement to prevent further escalation of conflict.²⁸ Notably, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur was fired by President Truman for potentially escalating conflict by proposing to nuke Chinese soldiers crossing the border to assist the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).²⁹ As a result, opposing sides of the Cold War mutually agreed that large-scale warfare would lead to a catastrophic nuclear war. To prevent this, the United States and the Soviet Union incorporated mutual assured destruction (MAD) into their military doctrine, which stated that first and retaliatory strike-capable countries would destroy both sides if one were to launch. MAD is based on the theory of rational deterrence, which means that the threat of using a strong weapon would deter the enemy’s use of weapons of similar strength. Therefore, neither side would be willing to launch a deadly first strike as the enemy would launch a retaliatory strike, causing mass nuclear destruction and fallout across the world.³⁰

Proxy Wars

With both sides understanding that there would be no winners in such a war, both the United States and the Soviet Union instead focused on so-called proxy wars throughout the Cold War.³¹ In proxy wars, larger powers fund smaller countries and factions that support their political agenda to avoid direct confrontation. For example, during the Congo Crisis from 1960–1965, U.S.-supported rebels of the Katanga and South Kasai region fought Soviet-supported rebels of the Simba and Kwilu.³² Many of these proxy wars resulted in a winning country, which often became satellite states—countries considered to be formally independent, but under heavy political, military, and economical influence from another country, typically the United States or the Soviet

²⁶ Mutual Assured Destruction; Col. Alan J. Parrington, USAF, Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited, Strategic Doctrine in Question Archived 2015-06-20 at the Wayback Machine, Airpower Journal, Winter 1997.

²⁷ Stalin to V.M. Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, A.I. Mikoian, December 9, 1945, in Politburo TsK VKP(b) i sovet ministrov SSSR 1945-1953 [The Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and the council of ministers of the USSR 1945-1953] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002), p. 202.

²⁸ "Korean War," Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War>.

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Mutual Assured Destruction; Col. Alan J. Parrington, USAF, Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited, Strategic Doctrine in Question Archived 2015-06-20 at the Wayback Machine, Airpower Journal, Winter 1997.

³¹ BAR-SIMAN-TOV, YAACOV. “The Strategy of War by Proxy.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 19, no. 4 (1984): 263–73. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45083584>.

³² Natufe, Omajuwa Igho. “THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS, 1960-1961.” *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente* 39, no. 3 (1984): 353–74. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40759745>.

Union.³³ Both these countries often supported smaller rebel groups, hoping to turn the country in which they were fighting into another satellite state.³⁴

While the Congo was torn into chaos, for example, politicians from the U.S. and the USSR focused on advancing their own interests.³⁵ During this proxy war era, many underdeveloped regions such as Africa, Central and South America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia were subject to these proxy wars due to their political strategicness and potential to be satellite states. A change in political policy to either communist or capitalist by these smaller nations created domino effects that affected neighbouring countries and altered political agendas.³⁶ Thus, with a single proxy war victory, the U.S. or USSR and their respective allies could change an entire region's foreign and internal policy.³⁷ Whether for economic benefits or to instill political pressure on each other, proxy wars benefited either party in their goals.

The Soviet-Afghan War is similar to many other proxy wars of its time. As a satellite state of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was crucial to maintaining communist stability in the Middle East. With Iran and Iraq becoming increasingly more Islamic and anti-communist, the Soviets were afraid that the anti-communist rhetoric would spread across Afghanistan itself.³⁸

1973 Afghan Revolution

The tumultuous times of Afghanistan escalated in 1973, when Mohammed Daoud Khan overthrew the monarchy and subsequently declared Afghanistan a republic. With the fall of the monarchy and a diverse array of political groups in Afghanistan, Afghanistan became an increasingly unstable region with constant protests and revolutions.³⁹ Daoud Khan was also a staunch believer in irredentism, a form of policy that is equated with a desire to annex territories from other nations. One of Kahn's main goals was to reunite the Pashtun homeland with Afghanistan, a stable territory of Pakistan. His constant diplomatic pressure and military threats towards Pakistan, a U.S. ally, further deteriorated the relations between two countries.⁴⁰ His iron fist-like rule and his purging of opposition parties made him unpopular amongst the ranks of the Afghani government, even to the common people. Soon later, in 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan—a communist militant group—overthrew the republic and began a Soviet-esque rule of the Afghani people.⁴¹ This constant unrest was often attributed to a traditional pattern of authority in Afghanistan and their inability to control the general public. Often, the Afghani people would ignore the central government, regardless of how authoritarian it was, and turn to tribal or religious leaders instead. Thus, tribal and religious leaders could easily start revolts if they

³³ "Report to the President by the National Security Council," Office of the Historian, last modified December 8, 1949, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v05/d17>.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Natufe, Omajuwa Igho. "THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS, 1960-1961." *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell'Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente* 39, no. 3 (1984): 353–74. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40759745>.

³⁶ Merrill, Dennis. "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006): 27–37. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552744>.

³⁷ "Report to the President by the National Security Council," Office of the Historian, last modified December 8, 1949, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v05/d17>.

³⁸ Hoodbhoy, Pervez. "AFGHANISTAN AND THE GENESIS OF GLOBAL JIHAD." *Peace Research* 37, no. 1 (2005): 15–30. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24469676>.

³⁹ Newell, Richard S. "Revolution and Revolt in Afghanistan." *The World Today* 35, no. 11 (1979): 432–42. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395085>.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

disagreed with the policies of the central government.⁴² With the PDPA's implementation of Marxist-Leninist ideas and their constant push for the brainwashing of Afghani civilians, their popularity decreased to a point where most of their support came from the Soviet Union. Consequently, the more popular tribal and religious leaders started revolts across the country, further weakening the grip that the central government had.

After the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan took over, further escalation between the regular citizens and the government began to erupt.⁴³ Specifically, tribes began to revolt against the central government. Due to the communist ideology, the dominant religion—Islam—was essentially banned by the government. As a result, Afghani citizens grew unhappy with the government and their policies.⁴⁴ Muhammad Taraki, the Chairman of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), also began to implement strictly unpopular policies across Afghanistan. His internal reforms were met with fierce resistance by the Afghani population which led to more conflict between the central government and the people itself. Notably, Taraki's land reforms in January 1979 to divide the amount of land that farmers owned was met with extreme resistance. Furthermore, his policies also opposed religious and Western beliefs, and he cracked down on the Islamic religion. Taraki's rule of Afghanistan challenged the core identity of Afghanistan, further causing internal tensions between the general population and the central government.⁴⁵

Current Situation

Afghanistan's Political Divide

In the spring of 1979, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) redistributed 3 million acres of farmland to 300 thousand families, limiting farmland for every citizen. This abrupt policy change enraged the citizens, who had already endured many impactless social and economic reforms. Therefore, due to the unstableness of authority in Afghanistan, nearly all regions and ethnic groups in Afghanistan violently rebelled against the PDPA government.⁴⁶ By autumn of 1978, Islamic-fundamentalist guerrilla groups supported by Pakistan re-entered Afghanistan after the Saur revolution. Major armed rebellions ensued in every region, including in the capital of Kabul with rising tensions between citizens and the oppressive communist central government. Moreover, despite political tension and unrest between neighbouring countries, the Islamic nations of Iran, Iraq and Pakistan united to aid the Afghani tribes that were revolting against the PDPA regime due to their fear of the spread of communism.⁴⁷ Later, the American government also started funding the Mujahideen, a notable Afghan rebelling militia group.⁴⁹

⁴² Ridout, Christine F. "Authority Patterns and the Afghan Coup of 1973." *Middle East Journal* 29, no. 2 (1975): 165–78. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4325356>.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Newell, Richard S. "Revolution and Revolt in Afghanistan." *The World Today* 35, no. 11 (1979): 432–42. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395085>.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Hoodbhoy, Pervez. "Afghanistan And The Genesis of Global Jihad." *Peace Research* 37, no. 1 (2005): 15–30. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24469676>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Nur Mohammad Taraki, the General Secretary of the PDPA, originally requested Soviet troops to station themselves at Kabul and help quell protests spreading across the country.⁵⁰ However, after Taraki was assassinated in October 1979 by the orders of Hafizullah Amin—who assumed the position after his death—the chances of Soviet aid looked grim. The Soviets believed that Amin was a puppet of the United States and that his presence was there to fool the Soviets. Amin leaned towards other countries such as Pakistan and the U.S. so that it would stop the revolts.⁵¹ Moreover, with his autocratic leadership style similar to the ‘Great Purge’ in the USSR, the Soviets were hesitant to intervene.⁵²

During the summer of 1979, security over the capital city of Kabul became uncertain as mutinies and attacks reached the PDPA’s home territory. As the communist regime lost most of their control over Afghanistan, the Soviets had no choice but to form a special committee. This committee was composed of Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) Chairman Yuri Andropov, Central Committee Chief Boris Ponomarev, and the Minister of Defense Dimitry Ustinov.⁵³ The committee was designed to fabricate excuses to justify an armed intervention in Afghanistan.⁵⁴ Hafizullah Amin’s purging of Soviet loyalists in Afghanistan may give the justification that the Soviets are looking for to begin a full-scale intervention.⁵⁵

Support of the Mujahideen

Mujahideen

As Soviet soldiers approach the Afghan border, tensions between the two nations reach a turning point. Both Afghan locals and rebels begin to prepare for an intervention by the USSR.⁵⁶ This divides Afghanistan into two distinct political factions: the Mujahideen and the PDPA government. The Mujahideen is the principal belligerent opposing the PDPA government, with approximately 200 to 250 thousand guerilla fighters at the Mujahideen’s peak.⁵⁷ The faction is primarily supported by the US, the UK, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Federal Republic of Germany, and China.

As Pakistan and the Mujahideen share historical ties and religious values, Pakistan has also provided significant aid to Mujahideen and the general Afghani public.⁵⁸ During the 1978 Saur Revolution, Pakistan developed a hands-on approach, allowing those opposing the PDPA to seek refuge. Their open border policy allowed Afghan residents to gain refugee status and provided essential items for over 3.5 million people.⁵⁹ Additionally, in Operation Cyclone—the Central Intelligence Service (CIA)-led operation to support the Afghani Mujahideen

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Walker, J. Samuel. “The Origins of the Cold War in United States History Textbooks.” *The Journal of American History* 81, no. 4 (1995): 1652–61. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2081654>.

⁵² Hoodbhoy, Pervez. “AFGHANISTAN AND THE GENESIS OF GLOBAL JIHAD.” *Peace Research* 37, no. 1 (2005): 15–30. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24469676>.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Chasdi, Richard J. “Letter to the Editor.” *Democracy and Security* 8, no. 3 (2012): 225–27. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602814>.

⁵⁶ Hoodbhoy, Pervez. “AFGHANISTAN AND THE GENESIS OF GLOBAL JIHAD.” *Peace Research* 37, no. 1 (2005): 15–30. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24469676>.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Marvin G Weinbaum, “War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role.” *Middle East Journal* 45, no. 1 (1991): 71–85. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328240>.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

through aid and intelligence—Pakistan was responsible for transferring military aid through their borders.⁶⁰ However, Pakistan refused to provide, train, or supply the Afghani Mujahideen with training and military supplies.⁶¹ Rather, it attempted to funnel arms from Western nations such as the U.S., and supported these efforts for the purpose of strengthening a post-war relationship with a new Afghani government that could work with it to counter India.⁶² ⁶³ Additionally, Pakistani President General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq's martial law regime in Pakistan became less popular among its citizens. Attracting international support from the West to help prop up its government could potentially keep the regime afloat.⁶⁴

United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany

The UK, West Germany, and U.S. are all key members of Operation Cyclone, the CIA-led operation to support the Mujahideen.⁶⁵ The UK and its intelligence agency MI6 mainly provide intelligence and military funding to the Mujahideen, supplying the Mujahideen with constant and accurate intelligence data that can help locate enemies.⁶⁶ Additionally, many retired Special Air Service Battalions from the UK have committed to fighting alongside the Mujahideen, and the UK has promised to begin training Mujahideen soldiers for combat situations.⁶⁷

West Germany, on the other hand, is less active in providing military and intelligence aid for the Mujahideen. However, it provides necessary humanitarian aid to internally displaced citizens and utilizes diplomatic, political, and espionage tactics against the Eastern bloc.⁶⁸ Additionally, it relays information from East German networks to the United States to figure out the Eastern Bloc's movements and actions.⁶⁹

While not directly in the conflict, the U.S. provides the Mujahideen with intelligence, training, and weaponry.⁷⁰ In 1979, the U.S. government and the CIA launched Operation Cyclone, which is currently the largest non-combat and covert mission totalling around USD 100 million yearly.⁷¹ It ultimately aims to combat Soviet influence in the Middle East. Fearing a repeat of the Vietnam War, the U.S. imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union to strain its economy and prevent it from scaling its war efforts. However, due to Islamophobic sentiments, the U.S. government chooses to keep Operation Cyclone confidential, with funding meant for Afghanistan sent to fake charity organizations owned by the government. Additionally, the U.S. government and CIA promised the Mujahideen with further economic and military aid in its fight against the Soviet Union.⁷² Facilitated by lobbying groups like the Afghan American Educational Fund, the U.S. raises over USD 600 million

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ "Declassified files reveal Britain's secret support to Afghan Mujahideen". *Times of Islamabad*. (2018)

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ John Waterbury, *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 2 (2017): 185–185. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44821755>.

⁶⁸ Kerstin Zeter, "Rückblick: Die deutsch-afghanischen Beziehungen" *Planet Wissen*, (2014)

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Cogan, Charles G. "Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979." *World Policy Journal* 10, no. 2 (1993): 73–82. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209308>.

⁷¹ Parenti, Christian. "America's Jihad: A History of Origins." *Social Justice* 28, no. 3 (85) (2001): 31–38. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29768089>.

⁷² Ibid.,

to fund the rebel groups militarily.^{73 74} This funding supplies the Mujahideen with FIM-92 Stinger Missiles, a shoulder-launched homing anti-aircraft missile designed to destroy low-altitude aircrafts. A type of Man Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS), this weapon excels at navigating and attacking low-altitude Soviet aircrafts, which could prove crucial in Afghanistan's mountainous terrain. However, if such weaponry is captured by the USSR, it could be used to inspire the Soviet Union's own shoulder launched anti-aircraft missile, hurting the military advantage the U.S. currently has.⁷⁵

The anticipated invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets also causes many Western countries to implement sanctions against the USSR and boycott major events such as the Moscow Olympics. Though not impactful militarily, these efforts demonstrate the Western bloc's united front against the Soviet Union. Following these events, the United States also terminates the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II), a treaty aimed at preventing intermediate range nuclear weapons from being developed. The USSR and the Eastern Bloc sees this as a threat of aggression and escalation, prompting the Soviets to raise military readiness across the Iron Curtain.^{76 77}

Support of the PDPA

The PDPA

The PDPA's conservative and highly traditional style of ruling has weakened their control with the modern state of the world. Therefore, in the past, government mandated policies had been met with violent uprisings as they often listened and had more respect for tribal and religious leaders, rather than the central government.⁷⁸ Moreover, with the current riot against the PDPA, they can only rely on a Soviet intervention to save them. Hafizullah Amin's unpopularity and disliking by the Soviet government, however, may undermine their support.

Nonetheless, due to the PDPA's communist ideology, it is supported by the USSR and, by extension, the Eastern Bloc.⁷⁹ With an additional 115,000 military personnel from the USSR and their own 250,000 government troops, the communists believe they are fully equipped to begin their conquest to reunite the Afghanistan region once and for all.⁸⁰

The Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland

Successive Soviet regimes have been interested in Afghanistan for decades, and Afghan-Soviet relations have always been cordial. With the beginning of Mohammad Daoud Khan's more progressive presidency in 1973, the

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Charles G Cogan, "Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979." *World Policy Journal* 10, no. 2 (1993): 73–82. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209308>.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Merrill, Dennis. "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006): 27–37. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552744>.

⁷⁷ Ibid.,

⁷⁸ Ridout, Christine F. "Authority Patterns and the Afghan Coup of 1973." *Middle East Journal* 29, no. 2 (1975): 165–78. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4325356>.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Marvin G Weinbaum, "War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role." *Middle East Journal* 45, no. 1 (1991): 71–85. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328240>.

Soviets aimed to find alternatives to inspire communism in the Western Asian region.⁸¹ A pro-Soviet group of militants named the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan gained popularity due to President Daoud's incompetence. Following significant Soviet military and political support, the PDPA seized power in the Saur Revolution of 1978, establishing Afghanistan as a communist state.⁸²

A perceived power vacuum in the Western Asian region, along with the ideological similarities between the two nations, motivated Soviet influence in Afghanistan.⁸³ Following the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement of 1979, the USSR became more desperate to contain the spread of Western democratic influence in the Middle East and Western Asia. The PDPA's regime of repression, terror, and rapid socialist reform turned many Afghans against them, particularly as many new policies ran contrary to traditional Islamic doctrine. As protests and dissent grew, the Soviets urged moderation to calm the populace, though the PDPA did not soften their governance.⁸⁴

As puppet states of the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland can serve as crucial allies in a conflict against the Western nations and suppression of dissent. As both are amongst the larger and militarily formidable nations in the Eastern Bloc, the two nations are likely to send military aid to Afghanistan. Whereas East Germany has the necessary funds and economic might to fuel the PDPA's coffers, Poland, despite crippling debt, can leverage their previous experience in the 1970s crushing dissent to aid the Afghan government.⁸⁵

'Neutral' Factions

China and Japan

The Chinese had initially planned to open a land route from Pakistan to Afghanistan, though this has not yet happened with the looming threat of a Soviet invasion.⁸⁶ Earlier this year as well, China fought against Vietnam, and having suffered numerous casualties, are not looking towards any large scale confrontation. Following Mao's death and Hua Guofeng's failed attempt to restore a Soviet-style system in China, Deng Xiaoping became the current de-facto leader of China.⁸⁷ ⁸⁸ Deng wants China to expand towards international trade and open the market to all countries worldwide.⁸⁹ Additionally, he wants to maintain a strong relationship with the Soviet Union, while also beginning to collaborate with the West economically.⁹⁰ ⁹¹ With China currently functioning as a nation with a new identity and beginning to form ties with both the U.S. and the USSR, they can serve as a hotspot for countries seeking information from one another if they can go undetected.

⁸¹ Joseph J Collins. "THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: METHODS, MOTIVES, AND RAMIFICATIONS." *Naval War College Review* 33, no. 6 (1980): 53–62. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44642132>.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ ANDRZEJ PACZKOWSKI, MALCOLM BYRNE, GREGORY F. DOMBER, and MAGDALENA KLOTZBACH, eds. *From Solidarity to Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980–1981*. NED-New edition, 1. Central European University Press, 2007. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7829/j.ctt2jbnww>.

⁸⁶ Aileen Kaiser, "CHINA'S INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN In the Centext of Sino-Soviet Rivalry." *Strategic Studies* 10, no. 2 (1987): 56–66. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45182701>.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Frederick C Teiwes., and Warren Sun. "CHINA'S NEW ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER HUA GUOFENG: PARTY CONSENSU.S.AND PARTY MYTHS." *The China Journal*, no. 66 (2011): 1–23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41262805>.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

Japan, on the other hand, only has a self-defence force as a result of strict treaties imposed after World War II. Currently, however, Japan begins to experience its first economic boom due to its increasing development in technological and industrial innovations. With its engineering capabilities being the most valuable economic possession, Japan is emerging to being the most developed and self-sustaining on the Asian continent.⁹² Although they are currently a neutral country, Japan can send financial aid for humanitarian efforts or even fund either side.

Initiating Crisis

It is December 25, 1979. Rebellions have spread exponentially, and the Afghan central government is becoming a major threat to the Mujahideen rebels. Across Afghanistan, Mujahideen rebels take on arms and finish their final layers of defences to prepare against an imminent Soviet invasion.

Seventy kilometres north of the capital city of Kabul, the heavily contested city of Peshawar in the Panjshir Valley, where over ten thousand Mujahideen troops are based, suffers from constant riots and Soviet bombings. The Mujahideen fighters are awakened by helicopters and jets flying south toward the capital city. Despite having portable, U.S. made air-defense systems and their own 20-millimeter anti-aircraft cannons, the Mujahideen are unable to target the high altitude of the Soviet aircraft.

The Kabul airport and key PDPA installations are also quickly seized by Soviet troops in desert camouflage and armed with AK-74s. The lightly armed Mujahideen fighters in Kabul are no match for the professionally trained Soviet troops who assume power of the city within hours.⁹³ Meanwhile, on the Soviet border, nearly 100 thousand Soviet troops cross into Afghanistan. Similar to their compatriots in Peshawar, the Mujahideen are poorly armed against the advancing Soviet troops, equipped with T-62 and T-64 tanks. These tanks travel into Afghanistan facing little to no resistance for the first dozen kilometres. Soon afterwards, the Mujahideen and countryside tribes armed with guns and rocket-propelled grenades inflict light casualties on the Soviet forces. Using guerilla warfare tactics, these insurgents fight on the hillsides, blending in with the common populace to hide their position. As a result of Afghanistan's mountainous terrain, most roads have been constructed at the bottom of valleys. Exposed to Mujahideen fighters entrenched in the hillsides above the road, the Soviet troops struggle to retaliate as their tanks cannot be angled to target the Mujahideen rebels.

U.S. and British intelligence have been working around the clock, instructing the Mujahideen on guerilla war tactics. Using similar tactics employed in Vietnam, the U.S. and other Western countries develop a hit and run strategy for the Mujahideen, causing the Soviet troops immense trouble trying to advance further than a couple hundred kilometres.⁹⁴ With the paratroopers stranded and encircled in Kabul, the Soviets are more vulnerable.⁹⁵

Despite Pakistani support of Afghanistan, local politicians and governments are still wildly corrupt and easy to take advantage of. With Pakistan's crucial role in the conflict, interfering with local governments could affect the

⁹² Peter Berton, "Soviet-Japanese Relations: Perceptions, Goals, Interactions." *Asian Survey* 26, no. 12 (1986): 1259–83. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644547>.

⁹³ Pervez Hoodboy, "AFGHANISTAN AND THE GENESIS OF GLOBAL JIHAD." *Peace Research* 37, no. 1 (2005): 15–30. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24469676>.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

large-scale side of the war. Delegates of each bloc must consider their assets and decide between diplomacy, espionage, or war, and ultimately determine the fate of this conflict.

Bloc Positions

United States of America

A global superpower and the foremost power of the Western bloc, the U.S. firmly opposes communist ideology.⁹⁶ American foreign policy continuously desires the end of communism, aiming to protect American economic and commercial interests internationally.⁹⁷ As a liberal democracy, the U.S. government is attentive to public opinion and the values of various lobbying groups; unnecessary shedding of American blood and failing to protect the interests of American companies could be devastating to domestic support and unity on foreign policy goals.⁹⁸

As the primary supporter of Operation Cyclone, the U.S. plays a key role in the conflict. It facilitates, supervises, and helps decide all major decisions that regard Operation Cyclone.⁹⁹ Due to Soviet deployment in Afghanistan, however, the U.S. chooses to not deploy troops to prevent direct conflict with the USSR.¹⁰⁰

While the U.S.' economic output is significantly greater than that of its adversaries, it must also be wary of public opinion within the nation and the desire of lobby groups, as conflicting ideologies would result in severe political instability internally. Many citizens may oppose the idea of engaging in another major conflict, as the Vietnam War ended less than five years prior. Moreover, the unpopularity of Islam in the United States could potentially spark backlash if the government was seen to be allied with Islamic groups.

Although the CIA is a government agency, its operations are typically kept covert and free from public scrutiny; that being said, the CIA must remain aware of potential backlash in the scenario any controversies surface.¹⁰¹

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union is a global superpower, the leader of the communist Eastern bloc, and a supporter of countless international communist and left-wing parties and organizations. Soviet foreign policy is defined by a desire to push Western influence out of various regions and to support fellow communist movements whenever strategically reasonable. However, the Soviets remain cautious to avoid unnecessary destabilization and conflict with NATO.¹⁰² Moreover, they are well aware of the unstable economic and political situation within their own

⁹⁶ "Cold War Diplomacy," National Museum of American Diplomacy, 2023, <https://diplomacy.state.gov/discover-diplomacy/period/cold-war-diplomacy/>

⁹⁷ Fry, *The Suez Crisis*, 1956, 10.

⁹⁸ "Cold War Diplomacy," National Museum of American Diplomacy, 2023, <https://diplomacy.state.gov/discover-diplomacy/period/cold-war-diplomacy/>

⁹⁹ Todd Greentree, "Afghanistan: Remembering the Long, Long War We Would Rather Forget," *War on the Rocks*, last modified February 5, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/afghanistan-remembering-the-long-long-war-we-would-rather-forget/>.

¹⁰⁰ Julie Lowenstein, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet-Afghan War: A Revisionist History," *Harvey M. Applebaum '59 Award*, 2016, 21, https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=applebaum_award

¹⁰¹ "About CIA: Mission and Vision," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 2023, <https://www.cia.gov/about/mission-vision/>.

¹⁰² Fry, *The Suez Crisis*, 1956, 10.

sphere of influence, and as a result, prioritize preserving order in the Eastern bloc countries over riskier attempts to push communist ideology abroad.¹⁰³

As it has direct military involvement with Afghanistan, the Soviet Union possesses a strategic upper hand in the region.¹⁰⁴ It has the ability to fund left-wing communist groups across Central Asia through corruption and other brute force tactics. However, due to the unstable environment of the Eastern Bloc, failure to pay attention to its Eastern Bloc will yield significant consequences in the stability of Eastern Europe and the political control the Soviet Union has over it.¹⁰⁵

Both the Soviet government and the KGB wield fearsome domestic power with few checks, but failure to contain citizens of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc may lead to troublesome uprisings and rebellions. Although technically accountable to the Soviet Government, the KGB is a highly independent apparatus with significant ability to take decisions on its own accord rather than that of the government.¹⁰⁶

Soviet-Occupied Nations

East Germany

One of the most important Soviet-aligned satellite states in Eastern Europe, East Germany remains an unstable hotspot for the Eastern Bloc. East Germany's primary foreign concern is the exodus of East Germans to West Germany. Consequently, East Germany's foreign policy will be guided by its need to build a sustainable domestic economy and prevent dissent—likely leading it to support other communist governments dealing with internal problems, particularly Hungary.¹⁰⁷ On most other diplomatic questions, East Germany will likely follow a similar trajectory to the Soviets in supporting communist, anti-imperialist, and labour movements. The East German government—although closely tied to the Soviets—and the Stasi, possess a fearsome Soviet-like power within its borders. However, East Germany's internal instability and reliance on the Soviets will limit any East German influence abroad. The capabilities of the Stasi itself are mainly focused on inter-German affairs, as well as situations elsewhere in the Eastern bloc.¹⁰⁸

As one of the two German states, East Germany is critical to the tensions between the two Germanies as well as the entirety of Europe. Spying and espionage tactics of the Stasi have created intelligence networks all over Western Europe, keeping a close eye on all Western European actions. Similar to the KGB, the Stasi can use its intelligence networks to blackmail and pressure diplomats and leaders, and also use brute force intelligence tactics to quell uprisings and revolutions in Eastern Europe. However, becoming overly invested in quelling anti-communist movements in other nations may cause internal instability within East Germany.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰³ "Revelations from the Russian Archives: The Soviet Union and the United States," Library of Congress, 2023, <https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/>

¹⁰⁴ Joseph J Collins. "THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: METHODS, MOTIVES, AND RAMIFICATIONS." *Naval War College Review* 33, no. 6 (1980): 53–62. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44642132>.

¹⁰⁵ Robert W. Pringle, "KGB," *Britannica*, August 17, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/KGB/Creation-and-role-of-the-KGB>.

¹⁰⁶ Robert W. Pringle, "KGB," *Britannica*, August 17, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/KGB/Creation-and-role-of-the-KGB>.

¹⁰⁷ Jennifer Llewellyn and Steve Thompson, "East Germany," *Alpha History*, last modified September 11, 2020, <https://alphahistory.com/coldwar/east-germany/>.

¹⁰⁸ "The Founding of the MfS," *Das Bundesarchiv*, 2023, <https://www.stasi-unterlagen-archiv.de/the-stasi/the-founding-of-the-mfs/>.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

Poland

Most of the Polish population has never experienced true national identity as Poland has been occupied by different countries for the past century. As a unitary state with a central government, Poland has been under the influence of Soviet national affairs since 1945.¹¹⁰ Due to their current instability with the solidarity movement on the rise, the Polish government is in dire need of Soviet support to quell uprisings in their country.¹¹¹ The Polish Department of Security is currently overworked due to the mass uprisings across the country. Thus, the country itself has weakened extremely and is very prone to infiltration.¹¹²

However, Poland can use this unrest to their advantage. The Polish people have faced economic hardships for decades, experiencing food shortages, inflation, and a low standard of living. The working class are continuously dissatisfied with their working conditions and lack of workers' rights. Many intellectuals and academics have challenged the politically passive state of the country, placing pressure on potential reforms. With the mass discontent reigning little change, the Polish population began to place pressure on the government. Protests against inflation and worker strikes against poor conditions began to frequent the cities, pushing the nation towards a period of change and uprising.

The Department of Security can form double agents to build networks throughout the Eastern Bloc and root out spies that are working against the communists. Thus, the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc can begin to allocate more resources towards Afghanistan. However, due to the popularity of these revolutionist ideals, agents may be unloyal to the government and attempt to make change from within. Despite Poland's relations with the Eastern bloc, its internal instability will make security a great challenge.

The United Kingdom

Once the world's most influential global power, the United Kingdom's role in global politics has declined since the end of World War II. However, the U.K. still aims to maintain its global influence, especially in regions where it once had colonies.¹¹³ Although both countries oppose the spread of communism, the U.K. must often make trade offs between protecting its own interests or following the lead of the U.S. and the CIA, who occasionally have different political aims and objectives. The U.K. is a liberal democracy and, as such, both the U.K. government and MI6 will have to remain cautious that their actions do not upset the public opinion for fear of backlash.¹¹⁴

The UK's foreign policy on the Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc, and Afghanistan are identical to the United States. Although both countries are involved in Operation Cyclone and opposed to communist ideas, the UK's capacity to fund the Mujahideen is far lower than America's. As a result of decolonization and its loss of territory, the United Kingdom's economic stability and power on the global scale is waning significantly.¹¹⁵ However, MI6 continues to possess immense political espionage abilities in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Although

¹¹⁰ Mark Kramer, "1981–1991–2021: A Retrospective on Poland, the USSR, and the Cold War's Final Decade," Harvard University, December 15, 2021, <https://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/insights/1981-1991-2021-retrospective-poland-ussr-and-cold-wars-final-decade>.

¹¹¹ "Solidarity," Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Solidarity>.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Fry, *The Suez Crisis*, 1956, 10.

¹¹⁴ "Secret Intelligence Service: About Us," Secret Intelligence Service, 2023, <https://www.sis.gov.uk/about-us.html>.

¹¹⁵ "Declassified files reveal Britain's secret support to Afghan Mujahideen". *Times of Islamabad*. (2018)

agents can influence corrupt politicians to gain advantages, misuse of this power could lead to significant security and confidentiality issues which could be fatal to the country's reputation and spy operations.

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)

Emerging from the devastation of World War II, West Germany has developed into a powerful European state and an important NATO member.¹¹⁶ The primary concern of West Germany's foreign policy is to seek peace and reunify with East Germany. As a NATO member, West Germany may also choose to support the U.S. or U.K. in this conflict.¹¹⁷

Moreover, as a liberal democratic state, West Germany's government and its intelligence agency, the BND, will have to remain cautious of upsetting public opinion. The BND also retains close links to the American CIA and is primarily focused on affairs in Central and Eastern Europe.¹¹⁸

Although it could even be considered as an extension of the CIA, the BND can use its close links with Eastern European politicians and leaders of underground rebel groups to cause chaos in the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, diverting their focus from Afghanistan.¹¹⁹ Though it is restricted and primarily responsible for affairs between the Eastern Bloc and Europe, the CIA heavily influences the BND, and they may weaponize their operation in the Eastern Bloc to alleviate pressure from Western-backed troops in Afghanistan.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan

A country born from war and seeing never-ending conflicts, Pakistan became a fully independent country in 1956.¹²⁰ Despite being united under the British Raj, after the declaration of independence, Pakistan and India became engaged in countless conflicts.¹²¹ As a self-proclaimed protector of Islam, Pakistan's foreign policy aims to demonstrate their dedication to Islam.¹²² As of current, the primary concern of Pakistani foreign policy is to combat India's influence to preserve Islamic ideals. While Pakistan is unaffiliated with NATO and has tense relations with Western nations, it has chosen to unite with the West to fight their common enemy of the USSR.¹²³

Due to widespread corruption in Pakistan, laws and actions can be passed if one pays sufficient bribes for support. Although, if misused, much-needed international relations with the U.S. could deteriorate significantly.¹²⁴ The Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) is responsible for internal security and the protection

¹¹⁶ Gregory Gethard, "The German Economic Miracle," ed. Michael J. Boyle, Investopedia, August 28, 2023, <https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/german-economic-miracle.asp>.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ "History of Pakistan," Britannica, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Pakistan/History>.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Robert W. Bradley, "The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan," *History: Reviews of New Books* 23, no. 2 (1995), <https://doi.org/10.1080/03612759.1995.9950993>.

¹²⁴ W. Eric Gustafson and William L. Richter, "Pakistan in 1980: Weathering the Storm," *Asian Survey* 21, no. 2 (1981): 162-171, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2643761>.

of national interests. The ISI has no close links to Western spy networks but does have links with the Mujahadeen, including personal connections to Mujahideen leaders.¹²⁵

Pakistan's role in this conflict is to protect its national interests. In this case, their interest is the protection of Islam. The Pakistani government has been helping the U.S. to lobby their money and weapons toward Afghanistan, acting as a middleman.¹²⁶ Pakistan has no intention of developing multilateral relations with the West; instead, they see it as a business partner working for the same goal.¹²⁷ Due to the current instability of the Pakistani government, Pakistan needs a reliable foreign power to be situated in its borders for necessary security measures.¹²⁸ The ISI has the ability to form close ties with the Mujahideen and provide them with the necessary support to help fight the Soviets. In turn, the ISI can form strong relationships with the Mujahideen with the possibility of them helping Pakistani national interests. However, Pakistan must use such measures with caution, as overstepping boundaries might mean the termination of support from the US.

People's Republic of China

Despite the Sino-Soviet split, the People's Republic of China (PRC) still believes that the communist ideology is superior, and thus, will stand with the USSR in pressing issues. The main reason behind China's support is that the PDPA supported Vietnam during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. The PRC is eager to play a bigger role on both the regional and global scale as the second most powerful communist state in the world.¹²⁹ Since the conclusion of the Korean War, in which Chinese forces intervened in support of North Korea, Chinese foreign policy has been keen to avoid direct confrontation with the US; instead, it has been trying to build an image of China as a peaceful, responsible global power. To achieve this, China prefers to peacefully build their economy by trading with all nations. In addition, Sino-Soviet relations have slowly deteriorated and may see China split from the Soviets on other world issues.¹³⁰ China also struggles with internal instability amid mass social and economic reforms after the death of Mao Zedong, limiting the extent to which the Chinese Government desires to spend significant resources on external affairs.¹³¹ The Chinese Government and the Central Investigation Department (CID) are extremely powerful domestically, but the unstable socio-political situation within China will prove detrimental to asserting Chinese influence abroad.¹³² As a new agency, the current capabilities of the CID are also highly limited, with most Chinese intelligence focusing only on East and Southeast Asia and still relying on Soviet KGB-style training.¹³³

¹²⁵ "Pakistan's Support of the Taliban," Human Rights Watch, 2023, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm>.

¹²⁶ W. Eric Gustafson and William L. Richter, "Pakistan in 1980: Weathering the Storm," *Asian Survey* 21, no. 2 (1981): 162-171, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2643761>.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ "Establishment of the People's Republic," *Britannica*, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/place/China/Establishment-of-the-Peoples-Republic>.

¹³⁰ Yafeng Xia, "The Cold War and Chinese Foreign Policy," *E-International Relations*, July 16, 2008, <https://www.e-ir.info/2008/07/16/the-cold-war-and-china/>.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Nicholas Eftimiades, "China's Ministry of State Security: Coming of Age in the International Arena," University of Maryland, 1992, <https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1108&context=mscas>.

China, although funding the Maoist group in Afghanistan, prefers to keep quiet about the issue at hand. Instead, it is more focused on developing relations with the U.S. as it opens its economy to the world.¹³⁴ The CID aims to focus on internal affairs by affirming the nation that other countries will not exploit China's instability. As a result of China's rapid development, the CID may soon become a powerful intelligence service in the foreign field. They can simultaneously gather intelligence with multiple countries and use such information to its own advantage without compromising its own spying capabilities. However, if its domestic affairs are not in check, it can lead to massive gaps in the security of China.¹³⁵ China prefers to maintain a neutral stance where both sides are not supported. Therefore, China will limit its resources in Afghanistan, supporting only a small group for political leverage. Rather than spending its resources in Afghanistan, China hopes to build its empire of wealth before meddling in political and military affairs.

Japan

Although allied with the US, Japan is reluctant to supply military aid and only provides humanitarian aid to help the injured and displaced citizens from the revolts. After a massive economic turnaround, Japan is on track to become the second-largest economy in the world.¹³⁶ Similar to the US, Japan is a liberal-democratic nation with the interests of its people and the major industrial companies at stake.¹³⁷ The Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) is tasked with internal security and sometimes, foreign affairs.¹³⁸ The PSIA values transparency for its citizens to spectate. All actions done by the internal affairs are published through the newspaper. The PSIA holds a fearsome technological advantage over anyone in the Asian sphere. However, due to post-war agreements, the capabilities of the PSIA are usually restricted to internal affairs only.¹³⁹

Japan is a neutral country regarding the Soviet-Afghan War. They have called for international involvement to stop and pushed to solve the humanitarian crisis at hand. Japan does not align itself with anyone in the committee to avoid conflict.¹⁴⁰ However, the Soviets have begun to increase pressure on the Japanese government and nation. The PSIA can use its superior encryption technology to infiltrate communication and wiretap communication lines in other countries with a low chance of being detected. That being said, the consequences will be extreme if their actions are detected as it would be in violation of the treaty signed after their WWII defeat. Japan prefers to stay neutral and focuses on protecting its borders. They strongly encourage countries to aid Afghanistan through humanitarian aid rather than militarily.

¹³⁴ A.Z Hilali, "China's Response to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," *Central Asian Survey* 20, no. 3 (2001): 323-351, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930120095349>.

¹³⁵ Nicholas Eftimiades, "China's Ministry of State Security: Coming of Age in the International Arena," University of Maryland, 1992, <https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/>.

¹³⁶ Hannah Shiohara, "The Japanese Economic Miracle," *Berkeley Economic Review*, January 26, 2023, <https://econreview.berkeley.edu/the-japanese-economic-miracle>

¹³⁷ "Government and Society," *Britannica*, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Japan/Government-and-society>.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ John Pike, "Public Security Investigation Agency [Koancho]," *Intelligence Resource Program*, October 12, 2000, <https://irp.fas.org/world/japan/koancho.htm>.

¹⁴⁰ Peter Berton, "Soviet-Japanese Relations: Perceptions, Goals, Interactions." *Asian Survey* 26, no. 12 (1986): 1259-83. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644547>.

People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

The PDPA was originally founded in 1965 as a part of the Afghan parliament. However, following the Saur Revolution in 1978, they assumed total control of the nation. Despite its democratic name, Afghanistan is a unitary state with a central government. The PDPA is reliant on Soviet support to quell revolution attempts by the Mujahideen.¹⁴¹ Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati, the secret police force of the PDPA, is focused on internal affairs only. Similar to Poland's Department of Security, KHAD is overworked and overstressed in dealing with mass protests and rebellions across the country.¹⁴² Furthermore, KHAD is also focused on the quelling of the Mujahideen, providing intelligence on Mujahideen positions and foreign aid locations for the Afghanistan and Soviet military to strike.

The PDPA is at the center of the conflict with the ability to pressure the Soviet government into supporting their domestic interests.¹⁴³ Furthermore, the PDPA can work with the Soviet Union to help spread communism across the West Asian region, while the Afghani security services (KHAD) can be used to help spread the message of communism across the West Asian sphere. Thus, this will help influence other countries into communist rule.¹⁴⁴ Due to the current conflicts ongoing inside Afghanistan, the PDPA and KHAD are extremely strained in terms of their ability to operate outside of domestic affairs. However, if the Soviets can pool more resources into Afghanistan, the Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati can begin influencing neighbouring countries on communism. Such influence can cause a mass domino effect in which a surge of communism will rise across the Middle East.

Discussion Questions

1. How can the political goals of each country be pursued by its respective government and intelligence agency?
2. How will 'neutral' stance countries cooperate with non-neutral countries to fulfill their national interests and political goals? What might motivate neutral countries to work with a non-neutral country?
3. How can each power exploit the unstable alliances and relationships between other powers, including the non-aligned powers? What are the potential disadvantages?
4. Should the government agency or the intelligence agency guide their country, or both? Why?
5. What resources does your position need? How will these resources be allocated if they are not readily available?

¹⁴¹ Victor P. Petrov et al., "Afghanistan," *Britannica*, August 25, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Afghanistan>.

¹⁴² Olga Olikier, "Mol and KhAD Security Forces during the 1980s," in *Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience* (n.p.: RAND, 2011), 25-36, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1078a.12>.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

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