


VANCOUVER MODEL UNITED NATIONS

The 11th Annual Conference · January 20-22, 2012

BACKGROUND GUIDE

United Nations Security Council





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Dear Delegates,

My name is Eric and it is my pleasure to welcome to you to the United Nations Security Council at VMUN 2012. I am currently a senior at St. George's School, and I have a deep-seated interest in international affairs. This will be my 5th VMUN conference, and I am very excited to serve as your director.

Members of the Security Council, the most powerful organ of the United Nations, are expected to have significant experience in public speaking, debating, and Model UN, and to be well versed in the foreign policy of their nations. Delegates should note that while diplomacy, negotiation, and flexibility are certainly important, they should always strive to adhere to the policies of their states. I suggest that, as part of their preparation, delegates pay close attention to international affairs and events in the weeks and months leading up to the conference.

The two topics that have been selected for consideration during the committee sessions are both important, pressing, and intriguing issues that confront the world today. South Sudan's recent split from Sudan marks a watershed in the conflict-filled history of the region and is cause for optimism; however, much work remains to be done, and many issues to be resolved, lest South Sudan become a failed state. The demarcation of maritime borders is also an issue of rising importance; increasingly, countries are jockeying for control over the seas out of a desire to protect national sovereignty, enlarge their territories and international influence, and bolster their claims to the considerable resources that lie in the waters. Without proactive measures, these often-aggressive and overlapping claims could lead to international conflict.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or concerns. I look forward to reading your positions papers and meeting you at the conference, and I wish you the best of luck in your preparations!

Regards,

Eric Liu
Director, United Nations Security Council
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Topic A: The Situation in Sudan

Introduction

Located in north-eastern Africa, Sudan has been in almost a perpetual state of conflict since its independence in 1956 from Egypt and Britain. Two civil wars, spanning from 1955–1972 and from 1983–2005, have left the region in disarray and have greatly impeded development. Both North Sudan and South Sudan have poor infrastructure and shockingly-high poverty and illiteracy rates. In addition, human rights violations are not uncommon: the Sudanese president himself is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide and other war crimes.¹ The causes of the conflict are numerous, and include poor decision-making on the part of Sudan's former colonial rulers, cultural tensions between Sudan's many ethnic groups, and ineffectual governments. Currently, though progress is being made, there are still many crucial unresolved issues on the table, including territorial disputes, a mechanism for splitting the considerable oil revenues, and strife within the diverse population. Furthermore, the situation remains highly tense and any controversy could easily spark further conflicts. In light of the fragility of the state of affairs, it is imperative that the Security Council take concrete steps to stabilise the region and promote the development of North and South Sudan.



Timeline

1899 — Sudan falls under joint British-Egyptian rule.

1922 — The Passports and Permits Ordinance comes into effect, limiting contact between North and South Sudan.

1943 — The North Sudan Advisory Council Ordinance gives an advisory council, composed of citizens, some control over administration in North Sudan. This was intended to be the first step towards autonomy for the North.²

1946 — At the Administrative Conference held in Khartoum, Britain decides not to establish a similar Advisory Council for South Sudan and instead proposes that the South be colonised by the North.

1947 — At the Juba Conference, the merging of North and South Sudan is made official.

1954 — Britain and Egypt sign an agreement guaranteeing Sudan's independence.³

¹ Al Jazeera, "Sudan: History of a broken land," 4 January 2011, [Al Jazeera English](http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/general/2011/01/201114134128217212.html), 6 July 2011 <<http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/general/2011/01/201114134128217212.html>>.

² Dr. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, "South Sudan: A History of Political Domination — A Case of Self-Determination," 19 November 1995, [University of Pennsylvania — African Studies Center](http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/sd_machar.html), 6 July 2011 <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/sd_machar.html>.

³ Jim Jones, "Various Routes to Independence in Africa," 28 March 2010, [West Chester University's Online Web Courses](http://courses.wcupa.edu/jones/his312/lectures/independ.htm), 6 July 2011 <<http://courses.wcupa.edu/jones/his312/lectures/independ.htm>>.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2012
United Nations Security Council

1955 — Fuelled by many Southerners' resentment at being mistreated and fear of becoming an invisible minority in a united Sudan, the First Sudanese Civil War breaks out.

1956 — Sudan becomes an independent nation.

1972 — The Addis Ababa Agreement is signed, marking the end of the First Sudanese Civil War. Notably, the treaty establishes the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region.

1983 — *Sharia* law is imposed. The violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement, among other issues, leads to the Second Sudanese Civil War.⁴

1989 — Omar al-Bashir becomes President of Sudan after leading a successful coup.

2003 — The Darfur crisis, labeled the “worst humanitarian crisis” in the world by the UN, begins.

2005 — The Second Sudanese Civil War ends with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) is established.

2011 — A referendum asking South Sudanese citizens whether or not they should secede from the North passes easily, and the Republic of South Sudan becomes an independent nation in July of the same year. The United Nations Missions in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) are established.

Historical Analysis

The causes of conflict in Sudan can be traced very far back. Even before the colonial era, there was a distinct separation between the regions of North and South Sudan. Early rulers viewed the South as weak and vulnerable and didn't hesitate to exploit South Sudanese; indeed, at one point, the Arabic term for “slave” was used as a derogatory term for someone from the South. In 1899, after a short conflict, Britain gained control of Sudan and formed a condominium along with Egypt. Britain recognized that North and South Sudan differed greatly in culture, geography, language, and history, and also that South Sudan was highly vulnerable; as a result, the Separate Administration Policy was adopted, which, as the name suggests, made the North and the South distinct nations which were governed separately. British officials hoped that separation would enable the South to develop without outside influence, eradicate the slave trade, and protect the South from Islamic expansion.⁵ The policy was implemented through several ordinances, including the Closed District Ordinance Act and the Passport and Permit Ordinance Act, which made it extremely difficult to move and trade between the two regions.

Although these policies may have been well-intentioned, they were poorly thought out. While Britain took a hands-on approach in North Sudan and actively encouraged progress by introducing advanced technology, offering more opportunities for education, and providing various agricultural enhancements, the South was mostly left to itself. In the South, this neglect led to economic stagnation, an ineffective justice system (in turn causing frequent abuses of power), and inadequate social services. Rather than allowing the South to catch up to the North, the Separate Administration Policy actually exacerbated the inequality.

⁴ Karl R. DeRouen and Uk Heo, Civil wars of the world: major conflicts since World War II (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2007).

⁵ Aleksi Ylönen, "Conflict, its Sources and Evolution: The Case of Sudan Revisited," 1 April 2004, University of Essex, 8 July 2011 <<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/uppsala/ws21/Ylonen.pdf>>.

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United Nations Security Council

At the 1947 Juba Conference, the colonial administration made another major blunder with far-reaching consequences. It declared that North and South Sudan would be merged into one nation, without having properly consulted officials in South Sudan. This move was a disaster for Southerners: many did not want a united state, and preferred instead to have an independent and separate South Sudan. Furthermore, as most people did not speak the official language of the new state, Arabic (Britain had banned it in the South due to its connections with Islam) and were poorly educated, they became vulnerable to Northern exploitation once again.⁶ In 1955, a group of Southern Sudanese soldiers, upon being informed that they had been transferred and now served under Northern commanders, mutinied, marking the start of a long war known as the First Sudanese Civil War.

A year later, Sudan became fully independent, cutting off all ties from Egypt and Britain. Many hoped that independence would somehow resolve the nation's numerous problems, but evidently, no such serendipitous solution actually manifested itself. If anything, the premature move to independence only worsened the situation. The first rulers of the united Sudan, two military generals, tried to forcibly assimilate the South by spreading Northern culture and religious beliefs, but these policies only led to an increase in insurgent activities and guerrilla warfare. Succeeding governments were no better at stemming the conflict, which by 1972 had drained much of the country's resources and had a death toll of over 500,000 people (of which 80% were civilians). It wasn't until Gaafar Nimeiry became President in 1969 that the government made a genuine attempt to end the conflict. Nimeiry respected the differences of Southerners and began negotiating with the primary opposition, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement.⁷ These talks resulted in the signing of the Addis Ababa accords in 1972, which made English an official language in the South, granted limited autonomy to Southerners, and instituted the right to religious freedom.

However, in the 1970s, incompetence in the Nimeiry government would eventually lead to the resumption of conflict. The government failed to improve the economy and provide relief during droughts and famines; further, widespread allegations of corruption, the imposition of Islamic *sharia* law, and an alliance with a fundamentalist Muslim group stoked growing dissent. In 1983, the Second Sudanese Civil War broke out, fuelled by many of the same issues that had caused the first one: religion, disputes over sovereignty, and a sense of relegation among Southerners. After six years of fighting and no end in sight, the Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, made the decision to withdraw *sharia* law, but was promptly overthrown by the National Islamic Front (NIF) in a coup d'état. Following the coup, Omar Hassan al-Bashir became President (a position he still holds today) and instituted policies that likely prolonged the war, including banning political parties and unions, instituting harsh punishments pursuant to *sharia* law, and allowing anti-Western terrorists, including Osama bin Laden, to operate in the country. Meanwhile, the opposition fractured into several factions, and the resulting infighting further protracted the war. Finally, in 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), also known as the

⁶ Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, "A Country Study: Sudan," 1992 йил 1-November, United Nations Environment Programme: Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch, ed. Helen C. Metz, 2011 йил 7-July <http://postconflict.unep.ch/sudanreport/sudan_website/doccatcher/data/documents/Sudan%20A%20Country%20Study.pdf>.

⁷ Dorothy Kavanaugh, Sudan (Africa: Continent in the Balance) (Broomall: Mason Crest Publishers, 2008).

Vancouver Model United Nations 2012
United Nations Security Council

Naivasha Agreement, was signed. The CPA included clauses which limited the applicability of *sharia* law, gave South Sudan autonomy, provided for a referendum on independence for South Sudan, created a government with representation for both the North and the South, split oil revenue evenly, and granted Abyei, a disputed region, special administrative status.⁸

However, as the Second Sudanese Civil War ended, yet another conflict arose in Darfur, a region in western Sudan. Accusations of the government favouring Arabs and explicitly discriminating against non-Arabs ignited a conflict between government forces and their allies, the Arab Janjaweed militia, and the opposing Justice and Equality Movement and Sudanese Liberation Army.⁹ During the crisis, both sides committed serious humanitarian violations including ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and rape. Fighting in Darfur has since subsided, though the region is still far from stable.

Many of the deep-seated issues that have previously caused conflict in Sudan, mainly political and social inequalities, continue to plague the nations today. If history is any indicator, it is crucial that these issues be permanently resolved lest conflict break out yet again.

Current Situation

Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was not completely implemented, the situation has improved. South Sudan seceded in July of 2011, a move that reduces the likelihood of another full-out war and also guarantees South Sudanese long-awaited protection for their culture and lifestyle. Critics, however, argue that the secession mirrors Sudan's hasty independence in 1956 in that the glamour of event conceals the many deep-rooted problems.

Violence amongst Ethnic Groups

For centuries, the many tribes, mostly in South Sudan, have fought amongst each other over cattle, which is an important part of the indigenous lifestyle (among some groups, it is used as a currency), over time forming blood feuds.¹⁰ Recently, thanks to the proliferation of small arms, the incidence of these conflicts has increased considerably and has led to over 500 deaths in the weeks leading up to the secession of the South. The violence is centred in Jonglei, the largest of South Sudan's states. The issue is complicated by allegations that the North has been supplying rival tribes in an attempt to fuel the violence and effectively weaken the South. Also, there is a deep mistrust among local residents of the government, and most locals associate themselves more strongly with their tribe than with their nation, making it even more difficult for the government to contain the problem. A second major threat involves, rather ironically, Southern rebels seeking to take over the North. These rebels, mainly based in the Nuba Mountains, are angered by the Sudanese government's militant actions and intend to eventually take Khartoum.¹¹ Such violence

⁸ Conciliation Resources, [A summary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement](http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/cpa-summary.php), 2007 йил 7-April, 2011 йил 16-July <<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/cpa-summary.php>>.

⁹ Carin Zissis, [Darfur: Crisis Continues](http://www.cfr.org/sudan/darfur-crisis-continues/p10600), 4 May 2006, 16 July 2011 <<http://www.cfr.org/sudan/darfur-crisis-continues/p10600>>.

¹⁰ Jeremy Clarke, [Tribal, rebel violence kills 2,300 in South Sudan: UN](http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJ0E76608Z20110707), 7 July 2011, 16 July 2011 <<http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJ0E76608Z20110707>>.

¹¹ Daniel Howden, "We are ready to take Khartoum, say militias allied to South Sudan," 11 July 2011, [The Independent](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/we-are-ready-to-take-khartoum-say-militias-allied-to-south-sudan-2311654.html), 26 July 2011 <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/we-are-ready-to-take-khartoum-say-militias-allied-to-south-sudan-2311654.html>>.

could seriously undermine government authority and could potentially break the fragile bonds that are currently keeping South Sudan together.

Natural Resources

Since Sudan's vast oil reserves were first tapped in 1999, oil has become a sticking point in many North-South negotiations. Sudan is estimated to have at least 6 billion barrels worth of oil (the region remains heavily unexplored) and produces approximately 500,000 barrels per day, generating over 9 billion dollars a year. Under the terms of the CPA, these revenues would be equally shared between the two nations, but with South Sudan's independence, clearly, these terms need to be re-evaluated. The problem lies herein: the vast majority of the oil is located in the South, and if the revenues were to be split proportionately, the North would receive only 25%. The President of Sudan has publicly stated that it will not settle for just a quarter of revenues, and has offered either to maintain the status quo and keep the 50:50 split, or to move to a fee-based model in which Sudan takes a certain percentage of each barrel processed using its oil infrastructure. However, for the South, any agreement will be made reluctantly as there is no guarantee that the North will keep its promises. In addition to oil, South Sudan also has vast amounts of timber, oil, gold, chromium, and iron, not to mention plentiful farmland.

Abyei & Border Demarcation

The border between Sudan and South Sudan is still somewhat blurred, with five disputed areas; in particular, both nations have hotly contested the region of Abyei. Valuable economically, as an oil-producing region, and politically, as a state on the border between Sudan and South Sudan, both nations have claimed it for their own. In the 2005 CPA, Abyei was accorded the status of a "special administrative region," an arrangement intended to last only temporarily, until a referendum could be held to determine the future of the region. That referendum, which was scheduled to occur concurrently with the secession referendum in January 2011, never took place, as the North and the South failed to agree on eligibility criteria. In May, fighting broke out between the armies of the two states, causing almost all of the residents to flee; in response, the United Nations deployed four thousand Ethiopian peacekeepers to the region. A permanent decision that clearly establishes the boundary between Sudan and South Sudan is essential to preventing further border disputes.

Humanitarian Issues

As a result of the never-ending conflicts, the humanitarian crisis in Sudan is only getting worse. Already, several million citizens have been displaced from their homes. Poor infrastructure means that over three-quarters of the population don't have access to basic health care, resulting in the rapid spread of diseases like measles and meningitis. The lack of proper justice has led to a proliferation of war crimes by all combatants. Furthermore, Sudan and South Sudan do not have proper infrastructure or sufficient resources (or even the willpower, in some cases) to effectively deal with these problems on their own, making them reliant on international aid. However, the North, which likely does not want to see a large foreign presence on its doorstep, has so far proved uncooperative and hostile towards foreigners, despite its claims to the contrary; sexual assault of NGO staffers is not uncommon and in the past the North has even operated blockades and revoked access altogether.¹² Even when aid workers are allowed to enter, the

¹² Rob Nordland, [Africa: War On The Rescuers](http://www.newsweek.com/2007/01/28/africa-war-on-the-rescuers.html), 29 January 2007, 19 July 2011
<<http://www.newsweek.com/2007/01/28/africa-war-on-the-rescuers.html>>.

poor infrastructure makes it a logistical nightmare to efficiently distribute aid and transport the injured to medical facilities.¹³

Omar al-Bashir

The President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, himself is a problem that needs to be resolved. Al-Bashir, who has been in power for over two decades, is currently wanted by the International Criminal Court for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes for his handling of the situation in Darfur, and evidence has come out that he has embezzled several billion dollars from the state. While it will be difficult to remove al-Bashir from office (nor would that necessarily be desirable, given the potential instability that could arise from such a dramatic move) and it is unlikely that he will ever stand trial, it may become necessary for the world to pressure al-Bashir to take more conciliatory stances on issues like Abyei and oil revenues if progress is to be made.

UN Involvement

The United Nations has been heavily involved in Sudan since the 1950s, with currently over a dozen agencies in the nation. For much of the 20th century, despite the UN's best efforts, many agencies were constrained to certain areas and weren't able to deliver humanitarian aid as a result of the wars. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the UN has stepped up its involvement and considerable progress has been made on many social issues, including supporting refugees, building infrastructure, and providing access to basic resources.¹⁴

Equally as importantly, the UN has played an integral role in maintaining the relative stability of the region. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was created shortly after the CPA was signed, and was authorized with facilitating the implementation of the CPA, assisting with the reintegration of internally-displaced persons, and protecting human rights. UNMIS was succeeded by the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) just before the July 9 secession date of South Sudan, and, like its predecessor, has been tasked with supporting the growth of the new nation. Also, in response to escalating violence in the area of Abyei, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) was created to serve as a buffer for the opposing forces until the conflict could be resolved.

The United Nations has also supported the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), a special panel authorized by the AU Peace and Security Council to reconcile the opposing sides and promote progress, pursuant to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. AUHIP, which is chaired by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, has helped to facilitate various agreements in the past and will likely play an important role in the future. Looking forward, while members of the Security Council generally agree that an emphasis should be placed on ensuring that both the Republic of Sudan and South Sudan develop into viable states, there is some dissension and a general uncertainty on the best course of

¹³ Doctors Without Borders, "[A Massive Humanitarian Emergency](http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=5424&cat=voice-from-the-field)" in South Sudan, 7 July 2011, 19 July 2011 <<http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=5424&cat=voice-from-the-field>>.

¹⁴ United Nations Development Programme, "[The United Nations Serving Sudan For Over A Half-Century](http://www.sd.undp.org/un_sudan.htm)", 30 March 2011, 12 July 2011 <http://www.sd.undp.org/un_sudan.htm>.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2012
United Nations Security Council

action; indeed, some observers have noted that the Council “seems quite unsettled in its approach to Sudan.”¹⁵ Therefore, it is imperative for members to come up with a long-term plan.

Possible Solutions & Controversies

Resolving the many problems in Sudan and South Sudan will certainly require innovative approaches. The Security Council must set a basic foundation for dealing with the crisis by determining its role, how those responsibilities can be met, and how the UN can galvanize the two states if talks break down; it must also examine the successes and failures of past UN intervention. A successful solution will necessarily address all facets of the problem, including political stability, economic development, and humanitarian issues.

The most pressing problem is the ongoing fighting centered in Southern Kordofan. So long as hostilities continue, more people will suffer and aid workers will have their mobility restricted, impeding them from helping those in need. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the two countries agree to a temporary ceasefire, at the very least, for the sake of their citizens. In the long term, the task of convincing all parties to stop fighting and in some cases, surrender their weapons, is difficult but also important. Firstly, the Security Council must actively monitor the region surrounding the border, particularly Abyei. Secondly, there needs to be a feasible plan in place to combat small arms. One suggestion has been to disarm civilians; reports suggest that most citizens would be willing to give up their weapons if their rivals did as well. If the support of local leaders is secured and disarmed villages are adequately protected, this plan could go quite smoothly. Other solutions include improving the local justice mechanism and having a stronger UN presence to discourage violence.¹⁶ Thirdly, the numerous tribal disputes that are pulling the countries apart need to be addressed. Many tribes have expressed interest in reconciliation: one chief noted that “with direct talks, we [the tribes] could resolve this [territorial dispute] issue in two days.”¹⁷ This approach would be desirable, but the problem lies in convincing the governments of both Sudan and South Sudan to unconditionally accept the outcome. In addition, the UN may need to consider ways to limit the influence of the Dinka, the largest ethnic group in Southern Sudan, lest the new state face problems with national unity and become another Yugoslavia.¹⁸

It is also important to consider the political aspects of the conflict. Although 80% of the border has been agreed upon, questions regarding the status of the remaining 20%, including oil-rich Abyei, continue to linger. The Security Council will thus have to determine an appropriate response; possibilities range from suggesting the withdrawal of all armed forces from disputed areas to simply ensuring the “soft” border remains secure while the issue is worked out internally.¹⁹

¹⁵ Security Council Report, Update Report No. 3: Sudan, 17 June 2011, 12 July 2011
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.7519749/k.5CAE/Update_Report_No_3brSudanbr17_June_2011.htm>.

¹⁶ International Crisis Group, Jonglei's Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan (Juba, 23 December 2009).

¹⁷ Andrew Heavens, Tribes can solve Sudan's Abyei row alone — nomads, 13 October 2010, 19 July 2011
<<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/10/13/uk-sudan-abyei-idUKTRE69C4X220101013>>.

¹⁸ The Economist, “Their day in the sun,” The Economist 7 July 2011: 43.

¹⁹ Republic of the Sudan Assessment & Evaluation Committee, AEC Final Report (Khartoum, 2011).

Vancouver Model United Nations 2012
United Nations Security Council

Above all though, there is the question of whether the North will abide by its commitments and promises, a valid concern given the North's historical tendency to back out of agreements that aren't favorable to it.²⁰ There are numerous ways in which this issue can be addressed. Academics have proposed myriad resolutions from the imposition of sanctions for violations, having a more visible UN presence or, more aggressively, empowering the South, either through arming it and training its army directly or by giving it the power to destroy oil pipelines leading to the North.²¹

Both countries are already negotiating in conferences facilitated by the African Union, but that effectiveness of that approach is questionable. The United Nations, though not directly involved in aforementioned negotiations, can certainly offer suggestions and assist in the implementations of any agreed-upon plans. However, in forging a solution, it is important to take into consideration the fact that Sudan may not welcome international involvement. So far, at least member of Sudan's ruling National Congress Party has stated this publicly, declaring that "the UN... [does not] have any role in achieving security and peace"²² in Sudan; it is likely that many of his peers share similar sentiments. Clearly, an overly aggressive approach could do more harm than good, but at the same time, the United Nations certainly cannot remain passive in such a dire situation.

Bloc Positions

United States

The United States, likely attracted by the vast amount of oil in Sudan, donates vast sums of humanitarian aid and provides the bulk of the funding for African Union and United Nations missions; it has also helped to broker the CPA. However, relations have historically been lukewarm and even occasionally bitter due to the Sudanese government's various human rights violations and tolerance of terrorists in the past.²³ As for South Sudan, relations have so far been quite friendly, and the US has pledged to continue to assist the new nation. Some speculate that without the US, South Sudan could easily become a failed state.²⁴ The US has recognized that a failure to resolve any of the outstanding issues could have catastrophic consequences and has shown a willingness to help support the states while they work the issues out.

European Union

EU nations have individually been active in assisting Sudan achieve peace and stability, but miscellaneous issues have poisoned relations. Since 1999, communications between EU nations and Sudan have steadily decreased in frequency, and the International Criminal Court's issuing of an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir in 2009 only worsened diplomatic relations. While the bloc provides considerable amounts of

²⁰ Alex de Waal, "The Wars of Sudan," [The Nation](#) (2007).

²¹ Richard S. Williamson, "Blood, Oil, and Sudan," 7 July 2011, [The American](http://www.american.com/archive/2011/july/blood-oil-and-sudan), 25 July 2011
<<http://www.american.com/archive/2011/july/blood-oil-and-sudan>>.

²² Peter Clotey, [Sudanese Government Dismisses Leaked UN Report](#), 20 July 2011, 20 July 2011
<<http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Sudanese-Government-Dismisses-Leaked-UN-Report--125905558.html>>.

²³ US Department of State, [US-Sudan Relations](#), 17 February 2011, 17 July 2011
<http://sudan.usembassy.gov/ussudan_relations.html>.

²⁴ DeWayne Wickham, [Can U.S. bipartisanship help save South Sudan?](#), 12 July 2011, 17 July 2011
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2011-07-12-south-sudan-independence_n.htm>.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2012
United Nations Security Council

humanitarian aid, the Sudanese government's refusal to ratify the Cotonou Agreement prevents the EU from providing development aid. The EU has expressed the need for timely solutions to issues such as Abyei and the oil revenues; internally, it is less concerned with terrorism than the US, but is certainly very interested in Sudanese oil.

Russia & China

Russia and China have been quite friendly with Khartoum: they have publicly expressed reservations over the indictment of al-Bashir, have potentially supplied arms and military equipment to the government, and have opposed sanctions.²⁵ Both countries are highly interested in Sudanese oil and are generally reluctant to intervene in other countries' affairs; therefore, they will likely oppose any resolution that limits the export of the region's resources. With that in mind, Russia and China, but particularly the latter, do not wish to be seen as obstinately blocking progress and are thus likely willing to compromise and unlikely to take extreme hard-line stances.

Middle East

Considering the two issues at stake are oil and stability, nations in the Middle East, particularly those that are close to Sudan, have a split agenda. On one hand these countries, most of which are oil-exporting nations, would benefit from an impasse over oil, but on the other, given the recent political developments (Arab Spring), it would likely also be in these countries' interest to see the two states stabilize.

African Union

The African Union has been instrumental in ensuring the progress of Sudan and has helped broker and implement the CPA. Its primary interest is to ensure that both Sudan and South Sudan become successful and viable states and form friendly relations with each other.²⁶ The AU is somewhat reluctant to have the international community interfere in Sudan (for example, it opposed the indictment of al-Bashir on the basis it could jeopardize the peace process), and instead emphasizes the resolution of the problems through bilateral discussions between the two states.

Discussion Questions

1. What role should the international community play in negotiations? Does sovereignty override the need peace?
2. If conflicts break out again, how should the world respond?
3. Should tighter restrictions be implemented regarding oil to prevent exploitation?
4. What are feasible methods to mitigate the impact of the many tribal feuds in South Sudan?
5. How much of a long-term presence should the UN have? Even after disputed regions like Abyei are resolved, should the UN continue to remain in the area as a safeguard against violence?
6. How should South Sudan's continuing vulnerability to the North be dealt with?
7. Given the poor precedent it could potentially set if al-Bashir is allowed to continue to rule with impunity, what course of action should the UN take regarding al-Bashir?

²⁵ The Associated Press, [Report Accuses China and Russia of Arming Sudan](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/world/africa/09darfur.html), 9 May 2007, 17 July 2011
<<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/world/africa/09darfur.html>>.

²⁶ African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, [Preparing for Two Sudans — A Future of Peace and Cooperation](#), African Union (Addis Ababa, 2011).

Additional Resources

<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org>

<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sdtoc.html>

<http://www.unsudanig.org/>

<http://unbisnet.un.org/>

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